The percentage of U.S. equity held by institutional investors has quadrupled in the past four decades, and a prominent share of trading activity is due to institutions. Yet we know little about how institutions affect the informational efficiency of share prices, one important dimension of market quality. We study a broad cross-section of NYSE-listed stocks between 1983 and 2003, using measures of the relative informational efficiency of prices constructed from transaction data. We find that stocks with greater institutional ownership are priced more efficiently in the sense that their transaction prices more closely follow a random walk. Moreover, efficiency improves following exogenous shocks in institutional ownership. Finally, we demonstrate that increases in actual institutional trading volume are associated with greater efficiency, an effect that appears to be distinct from the effect associated with cross-sectional differences in institutional holdings. 
I.

Introduction
The shareholdings and the trading activity of institutional investors have increased dramatically in the past several decades. In 1965, members of the Securities Industries Association held 16% of U.S. equities; in 2001, they held 61% according to the Securities Industry Association Fact Book (2002) . Nonretail trading accounted for 96% of New York Stock Exchange trading volume in 2002 (Jones and Lipson, 2004) , but institutional trading activity is generally not publicly disclosed. What does the broadened scope of institutional ownership and trading mean for the quality of equity markets?
We examine the relationship of institutional holdings, quarterly changes in holdings, and daily institutional trading to the relative informational efficiency of transaction prices, an important dimension of market quality. Analysis of a broad cross-section of NYSE-listed stocks between 1983 and 2003 indicate that greater institutional ownership is associated with greater relative efficiency. Prices of stocks with more institutional ownership tend to move closer to fundamental values, in that they resemble a random walk more closely, than prices of stocks with less institutional ownership. Examination of proprietary New York Stock Exchange data reveals that trading activity is one channel through which institutions make prices more efficient. All these results have important implications for the real economy, because more informative prices facilitate better-informed financing and investment decisions. 1 To construct measures of relative informational efficiency, we assume that informationally efficient transaction prices follow a random walk. Using intra-day transaction data over a 21-year period, we construct several measures of how far transaction prices diverge from this benchmark. Following Hasbrouck (1993) , we estimate the dispersion of differences between trade prices and a security's efficient price based on a random-walk decomposition. This approach distinguishes between informed and uninformed trading and uses a vector autoregression model to separate variation of the efficient price 1 Feedback from market prices to issuers of securities, noted long as ago as Schumpeter (1912) and Keynes (1936) , underlies the q-theory of Tobin (1969) . Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) analyze feedback between prices and cash flows. There is also extensive empirical evidence on the relation between market valuations and investment. For example, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) show that capital allocation is related to firm-specific information in returns, and Wurgler (2000) presents international evidence of a stronger link between markets and real investment in countries whose stock markets impound more firm-specific information.
(the random walk component of price changes) from variation of a pricing error (the stationary component).
To verify the robustness of our results, we also compute several more traditional and longer-term efficiency measures that do not distinguish between informed and uninformed trading. That is, we estimate how closely prices follow a random walk based on the autocorrelation of quote-midpoint returns at 30-minute and 60-minute horizons and variance ratios up to a monthly horizon. These supplemental tests generally support our main results.
Using quarterly cross-sectional regressions, we show that greater institutional ownership is associated with significantly greater informational efficiency. Our tests control for stock liquidity and several firm characteristics, and the results are robust across different measures of relative efficiency and different model specifications. These results suggest that institutions make transaction prices more efficient. Relative efficiency, however, is fairly persistent over time, so a positive relationship could arise because institutions prefer to invest in efficiently priced stocks. We thus conduct two event-based tests to try to establish the direction of causality.
First, we measure changes in efficiency from the quarter before a change in institutional holdings to the quarter after. We show that stocks with larger increases in holdings experience greater increases in efficiency, and those with large reductions in holdings experience declines in efficiency. Second, we identify all changes in the composition of the S&P 500 index during our sample period. Index changes prompt changes in the holdings of some institutions. Because index changes occur outside the control of institutional investors, the resulting changes in holdings should be exogenous. We find that changes in efficiency are positively related to such exogenous changes in holdings. These additional tests lend some support to our main conclusion that institutions improve informational efficiency.
We explore two mechanisms through which institutional investors possibly enhance the informational efficiency of the stocks they hold: increased analyst coverage, and institutional trading activity. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) show that institutional investment prompts a greater analyst following. The additional information produced by these analysts could then be responsible for enhanced informational efficiency. Controlling for analyst coverage, however, does not affect the positive relationship between institutional holdings and efficiency, and we find little evidence that analyst coverage affects efficiency directly. Thus, the positive effect of institutional holdings cannot easily be attributed to increased analyst coverage.
Another possible efficiency-enhancing mechanism is institutional trading. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) show that greater competition among strategic informed traders leads to faster incorporation of private information. Thus, to the extent that institutions are privy to information, efficiency should improve with their trading activity in a security. Moreover, if other market participants expect institutions to be better information producers, they could find it beneficial to be more attentive to order flow in stocks with larger institutional holdings. Market makers, for example, might change the way they infer information from order flow (see Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985) , or the way they balance price changes with changes in quote depth (see Kavajecz and Odders-White, 2001 ). Other arbitrageurs might change their order submission strategies to better adapt to changing market conditions. Our proprietary daily data on institutional trading allows us to show that both trading volume and the level of holdings are positively related to informational efficiency in daily cross-sectional regressions.
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that part of the efficiency gains can be attributed to institutions trading against the market and thereby providing liquidity. This reduces potential price pressure due to one-sided order imbalances and makes prices more efficient.
Our general conclusion that institutional trading improves informational efficiency contrasts with the view that institutions move prices away from fundamental values. Several authors present evidence that institutions are positive-feedback traders in that they purchase securities that have recently performed well and sell securities that have performed poorly.
2 Although Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) and Hellwig (1980) note such trading practices could be based on rational learning through prices, to others they raise concerns that institutional trading could be destabilizing and trigger informational cascades (Banerjee, 2 See Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) , Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Sias (2005) . Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) show that feedback trading can also be observed on a daily level. Sias (2004) also shows that demand for a security is positively correlated with past institutional demand.
1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Welch, 1992; Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2001) . Moreover, the known presence of feedback traders may prompt other investors to trade in a manner that moves prices farther away from their efficient values (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990) .
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To address this concern empirically, we define changes in institutional holdings that are in the same direction as returns over the previous quarter as momentum changes, and changes that go the opposite way as contrarian changes. In the cross-section, both momentum and contrarian changes are positively related to informational efficiency. This suggests that increases in institutional holdings improve price discovery regardless of their relationship to past returns.
A variety of empirical studies provide evidence that institutions indeed have privileged information, but there is only indirect evidence on whether their activities lead to informationally more efficient pricing. 4 Greater institutional ownership is associated with lower post-earnings announcement drift (Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky, 2000) and lower abnormal returns following equity issues (Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, and Varma, 1992) and dividend changes (Alangar, Bathala, and Rao, 1999) .
Institutional trading also tends to move prices more than other trading, which is consistent with faster incorporation of information (Dennis and Weston, 2001; Sias, Starks, and Titman, 2006) . Returns on portfolios with high institutional holdings lead those of portfolios with low holdings (Badrinath, Kale, and Noe, 1995; Sias and Starks, 1997) . Sias and Starks (1997) also document a positive relationship between institutional investments and daily return autocorrelations. We build on these findings by directly investigating how institutional holdings and actual institutional trading affect the informational efficiency 3 Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) show that institutional trades tend to be in the same direction. Such 'herding' raises questions similar to those we discuss in the context of feedback trading, but we do not address its consequences in this paper. 4 Titman (1989, 1993) , Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , Nofsinger and Sias (1999) , Wermers (1999 Wermers ( , 2000 , Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) , Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) suggest that institutions are better informed than other market participants and have at least some ability to forecast returns. On the other hand, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that mutual funds with poor performance experience outflows that may limit their ability to trade against the market if prices adjust too slowly to fundamental values. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) note several factors may prevent arbitrage in the case of hedge funds. Thus, even if institutions are better informed, it is not clear that their informational advantage translates into transaction prices that are closer to fundamental values.
of transaction prices. Our focus on short-term aspects of informational efficiency is in the spirit of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) , who argue that either market makers or attentive arbitrageurs move prices within a few minutes to incorporate new information. Their analysis shows that much of this information is impounded within 30 minutes. They attribute this adjustment to the activities of "astute traders" who can move prices through their trading activity. We build on this insight by focusing on intraday periods when such activities are likely to take place, and our tests are designed to capture their success.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section II, we discuss our data sources.
Section III presents the measures of relative informational efficiency we use. Section IV explains our empirical design. Section V contains quarterly cross-sectional regression results. Section VI analyzes analyst coverage and actual institutional trading as potential economic explanations for the efficiencyenhancing effects associated with institutions and the final section concludes the paper.
II. Data and sample construction
We use intra-day trade and quote data to compute various measures of the relative informational efficiency of prices. Next, we obtain all primary market prices and quotes from TAQ/ISSM that satisfy certain criteria. 5 For 5 We use trades and quotes only during regular market hours. For trades, we require that TAQ's CORR field is equal to zero, and the COND field is either blank or equal to *, B, E, J, or K. For ISSM, we require that the COND field is blank or equal to *, F, J, K, S, or T. We eliminate trades with non-positive prices or sizes. We also exclude a trade if its price is greater than 150% or less than 50% of the price of the previous trade. We include only quotes that have positive depth (this filter does not apply to 1986 data, where this field is not filled) for which TAQ's MODE field is equal to 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, or 12, or for which ISSM's MODE field is equal to A, B, C, H, O, or R. We exclude quotes with non-positive ask or bid prices, or where the bid price is higher than the ask price. We require that the difference between bid and ask be less than 25% of the quote midpoint. We also eliminate a quote if the ask is greater than 150% of the bid.
each stock, we aggregate all trades during the same second that execute at the same price and retain only the last quote for every second if multiple quotes were issued.
For records between 1983 and 1998, we assume that trades are reported five seconds late and adjust time stamps accordingly. Afterwards, we assume no reporting delay and make no time adjustment (Lee and Ready, 1991; Bessembinder, 2003 Table 1 ).
We compute several variables to control for security-specific characteristics or market conditions.
From CRSP, we compute market capitalization, consolidated trading volume, and daily closing prices.
From TAQ/ISSM, we compute trade-weighted relative effective spreads, volume-weighted average prices, and the price range on a daily basis. Effective spreads are computed as twice the absolute difference between the execution price and the quote midpoint prevailing when the trade was reported (or five seconds earlier during 1983-1998). The result is then standardized by the prevailing quote midpoint.
The daily price range is standardized by the closing price.
Panel B of Table 1 
III. Measuring the relative informational efficiency of prices
Our focus is on explaining the relative informational efficiency of transaction prices, rather than whether markets are efficient in an absolute sense. We define relative efficiency as how closely the time series of transaction prices resembles a random walk. This approach allows constant arrival of information and order flow, as well as market frictions that drive a temporary wedge between transaction prices and fundamental values. A departure from fundamental values represents an arbitrage opportunity that traders can exploit when transaction costs are sufficiently low. We ask what determines how quickly such opportunities disappear or, alternatively, how much prices can be expected to diverge from their fundamental value before any particular decision to trade (see Lo, 2004 , on "the adaptive markets hypothesis"). As suggested by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) , we assume that these decisions are made by astute traders who follow market activity in real time. To capture the influence of such traders, we require a metric that can capture trade-to-trade changes in the gap between prices and 6 Because institutions file a 13F statement only if they have a qualifying long position, the data may be subject to missing values. If an institution fully liquidates its holdings in a stock, for example, it does not need to report holding changes for this stock in the next quarter. In these cases we infer the change as the difference between holdings. Otherwise we use the reported changes, because they are adjusted for share distributions and thus more accurate. We cross-check adjustments for stock splits with CRSP and use the CRSP value in the case of discrepancies.
fundamental values and largely rely on the high-frequency methodology developed in Hasbrouck (1993) .
We conduct extensive robustness tests using lower-frequency measures based on autocorrelations and variance ratios.
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III.1 Pricing errors
To identify departures from efficient prices, Hasbrouck (1993) 
In this model, t indexes transactions and not time. The efficient price is the expectation of security value, conditional on all public information and the portion of private information that can be inferred from the current trade. It is assumed to follow a random walk whose innovations may depend on the information content of order flow, allowing market makers to react to private information revealed by orders from better-informed traders.
The pricing error may incorporate a variety of non-information-related effects, including the noninformation-related portion of transaction costs, order imbalances, price discreteness, and dealer inventory effects. It is assumed to be a zero-mean covariance-stationary process but may be serially correlated or correlated with the random walk innovation of the efficient price process. Because the pricing error has a 7 Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) use the measure from Hasbrouck (1993) to assess the effect of pre-trade transparency on informational efficiency. Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) use a simplified procedure also based on Hasbrouck (1993) to assess the informational efficiency of bond prices. Some authors estimate price changes associated with new information using liquidity ratios that relate returns to volume (see Schreiber and Schwartz, 1986) . These measures do not differentiate between temporary and permanent (information-based) price changes. Because a price change due to information would be considered an efficient reaction to news, while a price change due to noise represents illiquidity, liquidity ratios are not useful as measures of relative informational efficiency.
mean of zero, its standard error, σ s , is a measure of its magnitude. It describes how closely transaction prices follow the efficient price over time, and can therefore be interpreted as an (inverse) measure of informational efficiency.
Initially we estimate the pricing error on a monthly basis (although we use daily estimates for later analysis). We use all trade observations except when reported prices differ by more than 30% from the previous price. We consider these reports erroneous and eliminate them from the sample. As in Hasbrouck (1993) , we estimate a VAR system with five lags and four equations:
where r t is the first difference of p t and x t is a three-by-one vector of the trade variables: (1) a trade sign indicator, (2) signed trading volume, and (3) the signed square root of trading volume, allowing for a concave relationship between prices and the trade series. Following Hasbrouck (1993) , we assume that a trade is buyer-initiated if the price is above the prevailing quote midpoint (and seller-initiated for the converse). Midpoint trades are not signed, but we include them in the estimation (with x=0). The A i are coefficient matrices; ν rt is the residual from the return equation; and v xt is a three-by-one vector of residuals from the trade equations. The residuals are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and to have a mean of zero. To eliminate overnight changes, we restart each process at the beginning of each trading day.
Given the pricing process in (1) and the vector moving average representation of (2), with identification restrictions based on Beveridge and Nelson (1981) , the pricing error can be expressed as:
where ν x1,t -ν x3,t are elements of the v xt vector. The α coefficients represent the pricing error's relationship to non-trade information, while the β coefficients represent its relationship to trade information; they are estimated using the impulse response coefficients from the return equation in the vector moving average representation of (2). Finally, we estimate the variance of the pricing error, σ s 2 , from:
Henceforth, we use V(s) or "pricing error" to refer to σ s . To assure meaningful comparisons, we normalize V(s) by the standard deviation of (log) transaction prices, V(p), in univariate tests, and use V(p)
as a regressor in multivariate tests. To reduce the influence of outliers, we eliminate all pricing errors that exceed the standard deviation of transaction prices (less than 0.1% of the stock-month observations in our sample).
III.2 Autocorrelations
If prices follow a random walk, the return autocorrelation at all frequencies should be zero.
Because both negative and positive autocorrelation represent departures from a random walk, we use their absolute value as a measure of relative efficiency. Unlike Hasbrouck's (1993) pricing error, which incorporates the price effect of trade reversals as an integral component, a simple autocorrelation measure cannot distinguish price changes due to trade reversal from price changes due to new information. Thus, we construct returns based on quote midpoints to abstract from bid-ask bounce. Then we compute monthly midpoint autocorrelations based on returns measured over 5-, 10-, 20-, 30-, and 60-minute intervals. We exclude overnight returns and periods without quote change to avoid using stale quotes in computations.
III.3 Variance ratios
Early studies of market efficiency use variance ratios to test whether prices follow a random walk (examples are Barnea, 1974; and Hasbrouck and Schwartz, 1988) . A random walk implies that the ratio of long-term to short-term return variances, measured per unit time, equals one. Because we are interested in the gap between actual and efficient prices in either direction, we compute |1-VR(n,m)|, where VR(n,m) is the ratio of the quote midpoint return variance over m periods to the return variance over n periods, both divided by the length of the period. To compute the variance ratios, we sample quote midpoint returns at the appropriate frequencies over a calendar quarter and compute the variance using overlapping observations. For example, to compute the variance of 20-day returns over a quarter with 64 trading days, we use the 44 returns that are based entirely on days within this quarter. We consider intra-day measures based on ratios of (5, 
III.4 Descriptive statistics on measures of relative efficiency
Panel D of Table 1 contrast to the other efficiency measures, the gap between the variance ratios and one, the value implied by a random walk, increases slightly over time, but these measures also have sizeable cross-sectional variation.
III.5 Discussion
The three categories of relative efficiency measures capture the degree to which security prices depart from a random walk, but their interpretation differs in important ways. Most important, only V(s)
differentiates between permanent price changes that are due to information and temporary price changes that are due to market frictions. This generates the desirable property that only non-information-based This will induce positive autocorrelation (and variance ratios deviating from one) even when all publicly available information is efficiently processed. Expected pricing errors would be zero in this example as long as the price changes associated with the individual orders are not quickly reversed.
Computing pricing errors requires that we model the unobserved random walk component, which is used as a benchmark to estimate pricing errors. This may be problematical, as Hasbrouck points out, if prices do not follow a random walk at lower frequencies (Fama and French, 1988; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Poterba and Summers, 1988) . If temporary deviations from the efficient price take too long to correct, the variance decomposition will erroneously attribute deviations to changes in the efficient price, and thereby understate pricing errors. 8 Two important features of our analysis mitigate these concerns.
Most important, we do not use pricing errors to measure informational efficiency in an absolute sense.
Rather, we focus on the relative efficiency of prices, which we could reinterpret as the efficiency relative to a prevailing consensus, rather than some absolute benchmark. Moreover, most of our tests focus on the cross-section of stocks. Unless measurement errors implied by longer-term deviations from fundamentals are highly systematic across stocks, our inferences should not be sensitive to these concerns.
Another important difference among the three measures is their timing. Pricing errors are measured in event time -the model is advanced by one period after each trade. Autocorrelations and variance ratios, however, are based on returns computed in clock time (although we eliminate periods without quote changes). Measuring relative efficiency in trade time may be preferable because periods of active information discovery receive more weight.
Finally, while we are not primarily interested in whether additional information reaches the market in the form of private or public information, it may be useful to relate our relative efficiency measures to the traditional weak/semi-strong/strong-form taxonomy of efficiency (see Fama, 1970) . The autocorrelation-based and variance ratio-based measures fall into the weak-form category, because they exploit only information in past returns. Pricing errors based on Hasbrouck (1993) , on the other hand, cannot be easily classified. Pricing errors do not differentiate between public and private information.
Rather, changes in the efficient price incorporate price variation due both to public information and to private information inferred from order flow. As a result, pricing errors incorporate all public information (that leads to permanent price changes) besides information in past prices and are therefore related to the semi-strong form of efficiency. But they additionally incorporate the portion of private information that is inferred from newly arriving order flow.
We believe that pricing errors come closest to measuring the degree of inefficient (noninformation-based) price movements. They are based on individual trades and therefore reflect the actual behavior of market participants -the longer-term measures, especially the variance ratios, ignore much of the variation in transaction prices that we are interested in. For example, if deviations from efficient prices were always corrected within a trading day, variance ratios based on longer than one-day horizons would ignore them completely. In this sense, the longer-term measures are noisy measures of the relative efficiency of prices. We view them as a useful basis for robustness checks, because they are based on fundamentally different assumptions and a different timing convention. Autocorrelations are related to variance ratios, because VR(n,m) can be expressed as a linear combination of the first n-1 autocorrelation coefficients. Therefore, autocorrelation-based measures appear to be more sensible for shorter return intervals when the first-order effect may dominate, and variance-ratio based measures are more sensible for the longer intervals we examine. Empirically, we find no qualitative difference in results when each measure is computed over similar (or, in fact, different) intervals.
IV. Empirical design
We first examine the relationship between the relative informational efficiency of transaction prices and institutional holdings on a quarterly basis over a 21-year sample period. The basic model uses quarterly (or daily) cross-sectional regressions of relative efficiency on institutional holdings or trading:
where RE it is an estimate of the relative informational efficiency for firm i during quarter t (note that all efficiency measures we use are inversely related to the degree of efficiency); I i,t-1 are measures of institutional activity in firm i during quarter t-1; and the X k are a set of control variables. Throughout the analysis, we use lagged explanatory variables to reduce the potential effect of variation in efficiency on contemporaneous explanatory variables, especially institutional holdings or trading. The lagged explanatory variables can be interpreted as instruments for the corresponding current values, and our results remain qualitatively unchanged using current regressors.
Our hypothesis tests are based on the time series of these estimated coefficients, using NeweyWest (1987) general method of moments standard errors to compute test statistics. We use four lags, but the results are not sensitive to assuming a different lag structure. This approach addresses several issues that commonly plague similar estimations. First, estimating separate regressions for each period minimizes the adverse effect of correlation across securities. Second, applying the Newey-West estimator to the time series of estimated coefficients allows coefficient variances to change over time. Third, the approach allows coefficients to be autocorrelated. 9 We use several variables to control for differences across firms that may be related to pricing efficiency. The logarithm of market capitalization controls for differences in firm size. The logarithm of the average share price controls for a possible dependence of efficiency on the price level, for example, through a greater relevance of price discreteness in lower-priced shares. Lagged trading volume controls for differences in trading activity. In robustness tests, we also include lagged quarterly buy-and-hold returns as controls, but test results are not reported because they do not qualitatively change the results.
Moreover, we include a measure of average relative effective spreads during the previous quarter.
Effective spreads measure the total impact of an order on price, and we include it for two reasons. Our dependent variable, the pricing error, measures the portion of total price variance attributable to the transient component. This share could conceivably be related to the total price impact, and we want to abstract from such scale effects. Effective spreads are also a sensible measure of execution costs. Lower execution costs reduce the cost of arbitrage, and thus the costs associated with making prices more informative. Thus, controlling for effective spreads helps us to isolate efficiency improvements beyond those that are attributable to lower transaction costs. 10 We also include the lagged dependent variable in most specifications. This serves two purposes.
The time series of efficiency measures are relatively persistent, and we want to make sure that the attendant autocorrelation does not affect our estimates. Moreover, institutions might conceivably base their investment decisions during quarter t-1 on the prevailing degree of efficiency during that quarter.
Including lagged efficiency as a control variable should capture part of the variation in holdings that is caused by contemporaneous variation in efficiency. In general, however, we do not believe reverse causality is as important an issue in our analysis as in analyses that relate institutional holdings to returns or volatility. Many institutions may look at recent measures of return or volatility (see, for example, the discussion in Sias, Starks, and Titman, 2006) . We find it harder to imagine, however, that they would condition trades on measures of price efficiency that are not disseminated on a regular basis. We also conduct separate event-based tests to address this assertion empirically.
Finally, we use the standard deviation of transaction prices, V(p), as a control in the pricing error regressions. Because V(s) depends on variation in transaction prices, it should either be normalized by
should be included as a regressor. We obtain qualitatively identical results using either method, and report the latter because it imposes fewer restrictions. We do not include a volatility control in the autocorrelation or variance ratio tests, because both by definition are already scaled by a volatility measure.
V. Cross-sectional results for quarterly institutional holdings
Because institutional holdings are related to firm size, we divide the sample into size quintiles that are further divided into three groups based on the 30 th and 70 th percentile of institutional holdings.
These independent sorts are performed at the beginning of each quarter. Table 2 reports averages of the quarterly cross-sectional means: the pricing error, its normalized variant, a 30-minute autocorrelation, and variance ratios using daily horizons of (1,10) and (1,20) days. In each size quintile, all five efficiency measures decline monotonically (efficiency increases) with institutional holdings. The relationship seems somewhat stronger for lower levels of institutional holdings. Across size quintiles, the relation in terms of pricing errors is stronger for larger firms, but stronger for smaller firms in terms of variance ratios.
There is also some regularity in the other variables. Institutions tend to hold more shares in larger stocks, but we observe no systematic relationship between trading volume and holdings. Finally, there tend to be greater institutional holdings in stocks with lower average executions costs, but this relationship becomes less pronounced in the larger size quintiles. These observations motivate inclusion of controls for firm size, execution costs, and beginning-of-period institutional holdings in the crosssectional regression tests.
V.1 Effects of cross-sectional differences in institutional holdings
We use variants of Equation (5) model. This is consistent with an intuitive economic explanation: Higher execution costs make arbitrage more expensive, so prices can move farther from fundamental value. Overall, the regressions have reasonable explanatory power. As one might expect, explanatory power is lowest for the variance ratiobased measures (2%) and highest for the pricing error (90%).
12 11 We use the following dependent variables in unreported tests: V(s)/V(p), its logistic transformation, the autocorrelation-and variance ratio-based variables for the different horizons described in section III.2, and the absolute value of the autocorrelation measures (instead of the logarithm of the absolute value). We also compute median instead of mean coefficients and base inference on a Wilcoxon test. We also omit the lagged dependent variable, which may influence inference through its effect on the variance-covariance matrix. Finally, we repeat the regressions using current explanatory variables. All of these alternatives yield qualitatively identical results. 12 Sias and Starks (1997) find that institutional holdings are positively related to daily return autocorrelation, which is not inconsistent with our finding of a negative relationship with the absolute value of (shorter-term) autocorrelation. In their analysis of individual securities, Sias and Starks show that, controlling for firm size, stocks with low institutional holdings tend to have negative serial correlation, while stocks with high ownership tend to have positive correlation. In unreported tests we observe the same pattern.
We know from Table 3 shows the coefficients on holdings are significantly negative and comparable in magnitude to those reported in Table 3 , and the controls have almost identical coefficients. The change in holdings, however, has incremental explanatory power: An increase in holdings is associated with a significant reduction in pricing errors across all efficiency measures. Overall, these results corroborate our interpretation that institutional ownership is an important cross-sectional determinant of informational efficiency.
V.2 Feedback trading
Institutional investors often follow positive-feedback strategies by purchasing securities following price increases and selling following price declines (see Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2005) . It is not clear whether feedback strategies are based on information about the security, so their effect on pricing errors is an empirical question. To shed some light on this issue, we condition aggregate changes in institutional holdings on buy-and-hold returns over the previous quarter. We define momentum changes, TOTChgMOM, as an increase (decline) in holdings when returns during the previous quarter were positive (negative). Analogously, TOTChgCont measures contrarian changes: increases following negative returns, and declines following positive returns. If momentum trading is unrelated to information about the stock, the attendant changes in holdings should be unrelated to (or even exacerbate) pricing errors. Table 4 shows that the effect of TOT remains negative (although it is not significant for the tenday variance ratio), and the coefficients on control variables are similar to those in the other regressions.
Both momentum and contrarian changes in holdings are negatively related to pricing errors, although their relative importance differs across models. Contrarian changes have a significantly greater effect on the higher-frequency measures, i.e., pricing errors and ln|AR30|, but are not significantly different from momentum changes for the variance ratios. Overall, these results suggest that increases in institutional holdings improve informational efficiency, regardless of their relation to previous returns, but contrarian changes appear to be associated with somewhat quicker adjustments toward efficient prices.
V.3 Causality issues
We interpret our cross-sectional results in Tables 4 and 5 While it is not possible to establish causality, we offer two different event-study tests to help interpret the cross-sectional models.
If institutions causally affect efficiency, we expect to find greater changes in efficiency around larger net changes in institutional holdings. To test this hypothesis, we divide aggregate quarterly changes in holdings during quarter t into increases and reductions, and then divide each group into small and large changes, based on the group-specific median. We measure the change in relative efficiency from quarter t-1 to quarter t+1 for each category. We use the same efficiency measures as before, but add the normalized pricing error, which we believe is more appropriate in univariate comparisons. Panel A of Table 5 shows that large reductions in holdings amount to a mean change of -3.6% of shares outstanding, and large increases to a positive 4.1% change. Small reductions (increases) are much less substantial, amounting to -0.3% (1.0%). Most important, each of the five measures implies significant efficiency declines around large reductions in holdings. Large increases in holdings, however, are associated with more accurate pricing, but the changes are significant only for the higher-frequency measures based on pricing errors and autocorrelations. Finally, all efficiency measures differ significantly across categories.
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These results are consistent with our interpretation that greater institutional holdings reduce the gap between actual and efficient prices and may indicate a causal relationship more than the crosssectional regressions. But the changes in holdings that appear to prompt efficiency changes could still be endogenous. Ideally, we would like to examine changes in holdings that are strictly exogenous to efficiency, and then measure the change in efficiency around them. One experiment that comes close to this objective involves changes in the S&P 500 index. Many institutions hold investments in these firms, and index membership is sometimes a necessary condition. Thus, when the index composition changes, a subset of institutions will be forced to change their holdings in the affected stocks. These changes would likely be exogenous to informational efficiency.
We thus collect all additions and deletions to the S&P 500 index that affect stocks in our sample. Table 5 shows that the resulting changes in institutional holdings are quite substantial and in the expected direction. From the quarter before to the quarter after the event, additions are associated with an increase of 1.1% and deletions with a decline of -5.8% of shares outstanding. These changes in holdings are roughly 13 We estimate two additional specifications that yield qualitatively similar results (not reported). First, we divide aggregate quarterly changes in holdings during quarter t into increases and reductions, and then divide each group into quintiles. We find that V(s) and V(s)/V(p) decrease monotonically with the change in holdings, and all efficiency changes except those in the two groups with the smallest changes are significant at the one-percent level. Second, we regress the change in efficiency on the preceding change in institutional holdings and add control variables for the contemporaneous returns, volume, and relative effective spreads. The coefficient on changes in holdings is significant at the one-percent level for both representations of the pricing error, so changes in these variables cannot explain the relationship between changes in institutional holdings and efficiency. comparable to Pruitt and Wei's (1989) results for the 1973-1986 period. They are also of similar size if we measure from a year before to a year after the index change.
This experiment is a conservative test, because it has low power for two reasons. First, we cannot identify funds that are subject to rebalancing upon index changes. This implies substantial noise in the aggregate measures we use. Second, index funds, the institutions most likely to change their holdings around index reconstitutions, are generally passive investors (but could be active traders responding to inor outflows; we discuss the potential effects of trading in Section VI.2). On the other hand, the asymmetry of institutional ownership changes around additions and deletions suggests that not only index funds change their holdings around deletions.
We find that deviations from a random walk increase around deletions and are reduced around additions (not significant for some of the variance ratio-based measures). The efficiency changes differ significantly between additions and deletions for the short-term efficiency measures. Moreover, the magnitude of the change is larger around deletions, consistent with the greater change in institutional holdings. We obtain qualitatively identical results in regressions of the efficiency change on changes in holdings that control for changes in effective spreads, price, and trading volume (not reported). Overall, because the underlying changes in holdings are likely prompted by the index reconstitution, they lend weight to our interpretation that institutional holdings cause greater efficiency in the cross-section.
VI. How do institutions improve efficiency?
So far, we have not investigated the specific way institutional investors affect informational efficiency. We examine two potential channels through which this could happen: by fostering greater production of information, and through their trading activity.
VI.1 Institutional investors and analysts
Institutions might step up research efforts once they hold a stock, which may prompt others to behave similarly. For example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) show that the number of sell-side analysts following a stock is positively related to the number of institutions owning shares. They further show that the number of analysts has a significantly negative effect on the price impact of trades, a proxy for the information content of order flow. While the relationship between the magnitude of price impacts and relative informational efficiency is not clear, this result suggests that the number of analysts affects the intra-day information environment of a firm. It is possible that the efficiency-increasing effect of institutional holdings arises simply because greater holdings are associated with greater analyst coverage.
To investigate these conflicting explanations, we obtain the number of sell-side analysts for each sample firm from I/B/E/S. We re-estimate the holdings-only regressions in Table 3 but add the natural logarithm of the number of analysts as an explanatory variable (the holdings-cum-changes specification yields qualitatively identical results). We exclude stocks without analyst forecasts in I/B/E/S.
Controlling for analyst coverage has little effect on the relationship between informational efficiency and institutional holdings (or the controls): holdings (TOT) coefficients in Table 6 remain significantly negative in all models and for each efficiency measure. This suggests that the increased analyst coverage that is associated with more institutional ownership is not the main channel through which institutions increase efficiency. Moreover, the number of analysts is not significantly related to lnV(s) or its normalized variant (not reported). It is negatively related to ln|AR30|, but the relation is statistically weak. Only the analyst coefficients in the lower-frequency variance ratios are reliably negative. These results suggest that institutions have a more immediate effect on efficiency than analysts, perhaps because analysts are farther away from the market. While this observation may be interesting in its own right, the key implication for us is that the effect of institutions on informational efficiency appears to be quite distinct from the effect of analysts.
VI.2 Daily institutional trading
Institutional trading activity could be the mechanism that translates greater ownership into informationally more efficient prices. Institutional trades, for example, could be followed by a price adjustment toward fundamental value. Information-based theories of market microstructure such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) predict that prices change in response to private information revealed by the institutions' order flow. Or, if institutions provide liquidity during one-sided buying or selling pressure, they could improve efficiency even without access to private information. For example, if several large (uninformed) buy orders arrive contemporaneously, prices will increase temporarily to induce more sellers to participate in the market (see Chan and Lakonishok, 1993) . If institutions are better able than other traders to recognize these buyers as uninformed, they might be more willing than others to provide liquidity in these situations. 14 Then prices would on average diverge less from fundamental value even in the absence of private information. These arguments suggest that the effect of institutional trading could differ depending both on trade direction and on trade direction relative to the direction of marketwide trading. We capture these differences by conditioning institutional trading on contemporaneous returns and order flow imbalances. Providing the account type classification is mandatory for brokers (although it is not audited by the NYSE on a regular basis). Several different regulatory requirements include obligations to indicate: orders that are part of program trades, index arbitrage program trades, specialist trades, and orders from other market makers in the stock. Each of these categories is further divided into proprietary member trades, trades by retail customers, and agency trades. We aggregate buy and sell volume separately for each day and security for certain combinations of account types, using the number of trades, share volume, and dollar 14 Lipson and Puckett (2005) provide a specific example of such behavior. They study the trading decision of pension funds around large price movements, and find that these institutions use the opportunity to provide liquidity to cheaply execute desired portfolio changes. 15 In a related argument, Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2005) document differences between the trades of mutual fund managers depending on whether the trades are valuation-motivated or liquidity-motivated. Conditioning investment decisions on monthly net inflows, they find that valuation-motivated trades outperform liquiditymotivated trades. 16 Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) use the same data to study investor sentiment. Panel B of Table 7 shows average daily cross-sectional correlations. Both institutional volume and turnover are negatively related to V(s)/V(p), indicating that more trading is associated with less pricing error. Total turnover is also negatively correlated with the relative pricing error. This is potentially problematical, because institutional turnover and total turnover are almost perfectly correlated for this sample, which makes it difficult to differentiate the effects of institutional trading from effects of trading activity in general. The correlation between holdings and the fraction of institutional volume is 0.13, and the correlation between institutional turnover and holdings is 0.21. The correlations between holdings and changes in holdings (0.06) and changes in holdings and actual trading (0.04) are even lower. This suggests that neither holdings nor changes in holdings is a meaningful proxy for institutional trading 17 The NYSE defines program trades as the trading of a basket of at least 15 NYSE securities valued at $1 million or more. Many of these trades are part of index arbitrage strategies, and it is not clear that they are representative of the typical institutional investor in our sample. Other program trades may bundle uninformed order flow, perhaps delegated by retail investors, where the bundling serves as a way to signal the absence of security-specific information. All the results remain qualitatively unchanged when we include (1) all program trades or (2) only program trades not related to index arbitrage. Including program trades generally reduces coefficient standard errors, so we err on the conservative side.
activity. In fact, the best proxy for institutional trading activity appears to be total trading volume (ρ=0.99).
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We are interested in how institutional holdings and institutional trading interact to make prices more informationally efficient. We use daily cross-sectional regressions of lnV(s) on lagged institutional trading and lagged daily controls for price volatility, relative effective spreads, and volume-weighted average price, and quarterly controls for market value and the most recently reported institutional holdings. We use two different measures of institutional trading activity, one standardized by shares outstanding, and another standardized by total volume. 19 Table 8 shows average daily regression coefficients and significance levels based on Newey-West standard errors. As in Table 3 , lower execution costs, higher share price, larger market capitalization, and less price volatility are associated with smaller pricing errors. Even at the daily frequency, greater institutional holdings improve efficiency significantly, and the coefficients are about the same as in the quarterly regressions. In the first pair of regressions, the coefficient on institutional trading is significantly negative, whether measured as turnover or as a fraction of trading volume. Thus, both institutional holdings and institutional trading improve efficiency, and these effects do not appear to subsume each other.
18 Holdings or changes in holdings are poor proxies for institutional trading activity for several reasons. First, institutions report the net change in positions, but they may have turned a position over several times more. Moreover, there may be net purchases by one subsidiary and offsetting net sales by another; in this case, the 13F filing would show no change. Second, institutions like hedge funds may hold substantial short positions. Because short positions need not be reported, the trading volume associated with getting into and out of short positions will not be revealed by changes reported in 13F filings. 19 We do not include a volume control in the daily regressions because of econometric concerns. As shown in Table  7 , institutional volume is almost perfectly correlated with total volume. Our data on trading activity include no tradeby-trade information, so we cannot accurately identify the trade initiator. This makes the relationship between institutional and other volume hard to interpret. For example, suppose that most institutional volume comes from informed traders who have just received some private signal. Then most institutions would wish to trade in the same direction. To complete these trades, they would need to compensate other traders for providing liquidity and taking the other side. Therefore, the increase in institutional volume would be matched by an increase in other volume. Because we do not observe the trade initiator, we cannot differentiate volume due to information, volume induced by greater liquidity premiums, volume arising from traders mimicking institutions, and volume due to exogenous factors. The issue becomes even more complex when institutions represent more than 50% of volume, as in our sample, so that it is not possible for all institutions to trade on the same side. We conduct sensitivity tests using controls for non-institutional volume. In a first test, we include the logarithm of non-institutional volume as a regressor. In a second, we construct a measure of non-institutional turnover that is not correlated with institutional turnover by regressing total turnover on institutional turnover; then we include the regression error in the turnover regressions. The regression error represents the portion of total turnover that is unrelated to institutional turnover, and is a measure of non-institutional trading activity. These additional regressions are not reported, because none of them materially affects the coefficient estimates reported in Table 8 .
The second pair of regressions uses separate variables for institutional buys and sells, which we can directly differentiate in the NYSE data. We find that both buys and sells increase efficiency, but the coefficient on buys is four times higher using the turnover measures and almost twice as high using the volume measures, and these differences are significant. This is largely consistent with evidence that buys have a greater price impact than sells.
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More important, the remaining four regressions condition buys and sells on contemporaneous returns and order imbalances. Order imbalances (OIB) are estimated from TAQ as the daily number of shares bought net of shares sold, where trade direction is determined using Lee and Ready's (1991) algorithm. We define stabilizing trades as buys (sells) on days with negative (non-negative) returns or OIB, and destabilizing trades as buys (sells) on days with non-negative (negative) returns or OIB.
Stabilizing trades are likely to supply liquidity, because institutions trade in the opposite direction of the market as a whole. This decomposition leaves all previous results intact. Holdings are still significantly positively related to efficiency; trading is positively related to efficiency; and buys have more of an effect than sells. Moreover, we find a slightly greater efficiency-increasing effect of stabilizing trades, but the differences are very small and depend on trade direction (non-stabilizing sells are not significantly related to efficiency). Consistent with the experimental evidence in Bloomfield, O'Hara, and that informed traders may use limit orders, our results suggests that part of the beneficial effect that institutions have on pricing efficiency results from well-timed liquidity provision. But institutional trading in the same direction as the market, which is likely to demand liquidity, also moves prices closer toward fundamental values. Thus, the incidence of institutional trading appears to be much more important for informational efficiency than is its relation to marketwide sentiment.
VII. Conclusions
Institutional investor shareholdings and trading volume have increased substantially in the past two decades, with relatively little evidence on how institutional presence affects the informational efficiency of prices, one important dimension of market quality. Our examination of this issue uses a broad sample of NYSE stocks between 1983 and 2003. We compute different measures of the relative informational efficiency of transaction prices from intra-day transactions during this period. We then relate these measures to institutional holdings and quarterly changes in holdings in the cross-section of stocks.
A range of efficiency measures indicates that greater institutional holdings are associated with improved informational efficiency of prices. This suggests that the presence of institutional investors improves the information environment of a firm. Because our efficiency measures concentrate on shortrun deviations from efficient prices, the presence of institutional investors appears to make market participants who are close to the trading process more attentive.
We provide some direct evidence that institutions themselves have a role in this process.
Proprietary data on institutional trading show that the trading activity is directly associated with efficiency improvements. This results partly from the provision of liquidity when the market faces price pressure, but institutional trading also improves efficiency trades are in the same direction as the market. We also document that the extent of institutional holdings per se has additional influence on efficiency, beyond the effect we can attribute to their trading activity. We interpret this as evidence that other market participants, perhaps market makers, also become more attentive when institutional ownership increases.
Our results are inconsistent with the view that financial analysts, rather than institutions, are responsible for enhanced efficiency, because the results remain largely unchanged when we control for analyst coverage. We show that analyst coverage has little effect on informational efficiency; our tests suggest that their impact is quite distinct from the influence of institutional investors.
Previous studies document that institutions are often positive-feedback traders. Our quarterly evidence shows that increases in institutional holdings improve efficiency even under positive-feedback strategies. These findings are consistent with the view that positive-feedback trading is the result of an economically meaningful strategy, perhaps due to in-and outflows that are correlated with past returns, rather than a manifestation of irrational behavior.
While our measures of the relative efficiency of prices concentrate on the short run, we believe that the effects we document are distinct from the dimensions of market quality typically assessed in studies of market microstructure. In particular, we control for execution costs throughout the analysis, so the effect we ascribe to institutional investors goes beyond simple reductions in trading costs. Moreover, we show that longer-term measures based on variance ratios up to a one-month horizon yield very similar conclusions.
In a broader sense, the informational efficiency of prices is a valuable public good-all market participants benefit from more efficient prices. Our finding that institutions improve efficiency contributes to the debate on how their increasing presence affects the quality of equity markets. It seems important for future research efforts to identify the channels through which these efficiency improvements materialize, because the precise nature of the process is likely to have important implications for the optimal design of markets, trading protocols, and regulatory policy. Hasbrouck (1993) . |AR 30| is the absolute value of the 30-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation. VR(n,m) represent variance ratios of the m -day price variance per unit time divided by the n -day price variance per unit time. V(p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. RES is the trade-weighted relative effective spread, QVOL is share trading volume, Price is the share price, TOT is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions that file quarterly 13F reports, and MV is the market value of equity. Table 3 : Cross-sectional effect of lagged institutional holdings on pricing errors The sample is based on NYSE-listed securities between 1983 and 2003. We conduct quarterly crosssectional regressions and this table reports mean coefficients over the 84 quarters in our sample. We test for significance using the time series variation in the regression coefficients over these 84 periods and report the significance level based on Newey-West standard errors. The asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**), and 10% level (*). V(s) is the pricing error based on Hasbrouck (1993) . |AR 30| is the absolute value of the 30-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation. VR(n,m) represent variance ratios of the m -day price variance per unit time divided by the n -day price variance per unit time. V(p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. TOT is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions that file quarterly 13F reports. TOTChg is the signed percentage of shares outstanding by which these institutions' aggregate holdings have changed during a quarter. RES is the trade-weighted relative effective spread. QVOL is share trading volume, MV is the market value of equity, and Price is the share price. Lag1 indicates a value lagged by one quarter. Ln is the natural logarithm. Lag1_DV is the lagged value of the dependent variable. Table 4 : Cross-sectional effect of momentum and contrarian changes in institutional holdings The sample is based on NYSE-listed securities between 1983 and 2003. We conduct quarterly cross-sectional regressions and this table reports means and medians over the 84 quarters in our sample. We test for significance using the time series variation in the regression coefficients over these 84 periods and report the significance level based on Newey-West standard errors. The asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**), and 10% level (*). V(s) is the pricing error based on Hasbrouck (1993) . VR(n,m) represent variance ratios of the m -day price variance per unit time divided by the n -day price variance per unit time. V(p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. |AR 30| is the absolute value of the 30-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation. TOT is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions that file quarterly 13F reports. TOTChg is the signed percentage of shares outstanding by which these institutions' aggregate holdings have changed during a quarter. TOTChgMom includes only increases (reductions) in reported holdings following a positive (negative) buy-and-hold return in the previous quarter, and vice versa for TOTChgCont. RES is the trade-weighted relative effective spread. QVOL is share trading volume, MV is the market value of equity, and Price is the share price. Lag1 indicates a value lagged by one quarter, Lag2 indicates a value lagged by two quarters. Ln is the natural logarithm. Lag1_DV is the lagged value of the dependent variable. Change from quarter t-1 to quarter t+1, omitting the quarter of the index change Table 5 : Effect of changes in institutional ownership on the informational efficiency of prices into increases and reductions. We further split each group at its median, creating large (small) increases and reductions and report the results of an event study around these four categories of changes in institutional holdings. We show the mean change of several measures of informational efficiency, computed from the quarter before the event to the quarter following it (the quarter of the event is omitted). p-values next to the estimated mean changes refer to standard t-tests and the p-value for the ANOVA test of equality across groups refers to an F-test. In Panel B, we identify changes in the S&P 500 index between 1983 and 2003 and conduct an event study only for stocks that are added to or removed from the index. Changes are computed as in Panel A, omitting the quarter of the index change.
The sample is based on NYSE-listed securities between 1983 and 2003. V(s) is the relative pricing error based on Hasbrouck (1993) . |AR 30| is the absolute value of the 30-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation. VR(n,m) represent variance ratios of the m -day price variance per unit time divided by the n -day price variance per unit time. TOT is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions that file quarterly 13F reports. TOTChg is the signed percentage of shares outstanding by which these institutions' aggregate holdings have changed during a quarter. V(p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. In Panel A, we divide quarterly changes in institutional holdings (TOTChg)
Change from quarter t-1 to quarter t+1, omitting the quarter of the holdings change Table 6 : Cross-sectional effect of analyst coverage on pricing errors The sample is based on NYSE-listed securities between 1983 and 2003. We conduct quarterly cross-sectional regressions and this table reports means over the 84 quarters in our sample. We test for significance using the time series variation in the regression coefficients over these 84 periods and report the significance level based on Newey-West standard errors. The asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**), and 10% level (*). V(s) is the pricing error based on Hasbrouck (1993) . VR(n,m) represent variance ratios of the m -day price variance per unit time divided by the n -day price variance per unit time. V(p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. |AR30| is the absolute value of the 30-minute quote midpoint return autocorrelation. TOT is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions that file quarterly 13F reports. TOTChg is the signed percentage of shares outstanding by which these institutions' aggregate holdings have changed during a quarter. NumAn is the number of analysts covering a stock. RES is the trade-weighted relative effective spread. QVOL is share trading volume, MV is the market value of equity, and Price is the share price. Lag1 indicates a value lagged by one quarter, Lag2 indicates a value lagged by two quarters. Ln is the natural logarithm. Lag1_DV is the lagged value of the dependent variable. Table 7 : Descriptive statistics on daily institutional trading The sample is based on NYSE-listed securities between Jan 1, 2000 and Dec 31, 2003. We compute cross-sectional means and standard deviations for every trading day and report statistics on the time series of these estimates. For example, Mean Std is the time series average of the 1,003 daily cross-sectional standard deviations. The sample contains only stocks with at least 100 trades per day. N is the average number of securities per day. V(s) is the daily pricing error based on Hasbrouck (1993) . V(p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. TOT is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions that file quarterly 13F reports, and TOTChg is the reported quarterly change from these reports. Ivol is the institutional trading volume executed on the NYSE. TotVol is total volume executed on the NYSE, and Shrout is the number of shares outstanding. Table 8 : Cross-sectional effect of daily institutional trading on pricing errors The sample is based on NYSE-listed securities between Jan 1, 2000 and Dec 31, 2003. The sample contains only stocks with at least 100 trades per day. We conduct daily cross-sectional regressions and report means and medians over the 1,003 days in our sample. We test for significance using the time series variation in the regression coefficients over these periods and report the significance level based on Newey-West standard errors. The asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**), and 10% level (*). V(s) is the pricing error based on Hasbrouck (1993) , estimated daily. V(p) is the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. TOT is the most most recent quarterly fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions that file quarterly 13F reports, as reported in the most recent quarterly report. Ivol/TotVol is the fraction of total NYSE volume due to institutional trading. Ivol/Shrout is NYSE institutional volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. RES is the tradeweighted relative effective spread. MV is the quarterly market value of equity, and VWAP is the volume-weighted average share price. Lag1 indicates a value lagged by one quarter. Ln is the natural logarithm. Lag1_DV is the lagged value of the dependent variable. All variables except TOT and MV are measured daily. Order imbalances are computed as buy-signed minus sell-signed trading volume. 25 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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